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Abstract—Enterprise Architecture Management (EAM) is 
considered to provide the mechanism for, amongst others, 
governing enterprise transformations required by changes in the 
environment. In this paper, we focus on changes that result from 
the analysis of information security risks and of their impacts on 
the services delivered by an enterprise. We present how the 
concepts of an information system security risks management 
domain can be mapped into the ArchiMate enterprise 
architecture modeling language. We illustrate the application of 
the proposed approach through the handling of a lab case. 
Keywords—EAM, Information Security Risk Management, 
ArchiMate, Enterprise Model Integration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To remain competitive in the growing services economies, 
enterprises have to transform themselves in business service 
oriented enterprises.  Business services are delivered by service 
system defined as “a configuration of people, processes, 
technology and shared information connected through a value 
proposition with the aim of a dynamic co-creation of value 
through the participation in the exchanges with customers and 
external/internal service systems” [1]. According to this view, a 
service system can be composed of service systems, 
cooperating to produce the business service. It is typically 
observed in value constellation like a cloud ecosystem, where 
the final user of the cloud service (whether IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) 
depends on a chain of business partners.  
The value proposition of a service system can be refined 
into a number of requirements characterizing the expected 
qualities of the business services. Usually a distinction is made 
between functional and non-functional requirements. In this 
paper, we investigate a specific type of non-functional 
requirements which are those related to security qualities 
associated with information delivered through business 
services. Today, many business services are information 
intensive and thus security requirements like e.g. information 
confidentiality or privacy are essential.  According to the usual 
requirements engineering terminology [26, 27], we call 
“security goals” these requirements in the rest of the paper.  
The sources for these security goals are customers’ needs (e.g. 
need for confidentiality of the information stored on the cloud) 
but also, in an increased regulated market, the compliance with 
regulations and norms (e.g. the compliance with privacy of 
information manipulated by the service provider). The 
achievement of security goals associated with the business 
services delivered by a service system is heavily depending on 
the quality of the Information System (IS) implementing it. 
Thus the alignment of the deployed information system with 
the business perspective is a key issue. 
One of the main purposes of Enterprise Architecture 
Management (EAM) is to align an enterprise to its 
requirements and business goals, and specifically in our 
context business services goals.  EAM helps to design and 
guarantee a coherent enterprise’s organizational structure, 
business processes, and infrastructure [2] through a set of 
models. It transforms enterprise governance into informed 
enterprise governance [3]. The occurrence of security breaches 
(for example the corruption of a database) may result in 
deviations (misalignments) between the business goals of the 
enterprise and their realization in terms of its implemented 
information system. The solutions to overcome these 
misalignments are more and more complex and it is not always 
either technically or economically sustainable for an enterprise 
to solve all the potential breaches. Risk Management (RM) as a 
decision tool therefore becomes a central activity in the design 
of the architecture components (the so-called “counter-
measures”) preventing these misalignments. 
There exist many Information System Security Risk 
Management (ISSRM) approaches for analyzing and managing 
the potential security breaches. The first objective of the paper 
is to report about our contribution in an extended EAM 
supporting a security risk-oriented design of an Enterprise 
Architecture (EA), meeting its associated business services 
security goals. The core of the framework relies on the 
integration of ISSRM concepts into EA constructs with a 
service system perspective. 
The second objective of the paper is to address the 
representation of the performed security risk analysis. A large 
majority of existing ISSRM approaches are based on the 
production of textual information, some of them being 
structured in tabular forms. Thus in general they lack from 
formal notation and representation. Moreover the traceability 
between the different elements of the risk model is also 
difficult to manage. To overcome these difficulties, our 
proposed extended EAM is embedded in the ArchiMate 
modeling language [4]. ArchiMate has been purposely 
designed for supporting EAM, and recent extensions include 
constructs supporting the service-oriented enterprise. Our 
proposal aims at using it in conjunction with concepts of 
information security risks analysis. Of a particular interest is 
the Business Motivation Model, which we use through the 
ArchiMate Motivation Extension, for expressing the specific 
risk analysis related motivations for architecture principles and 
decisions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, 
we provide some background knowledge regarding our 
proposed extended EAM. On the one hand, this includes an 
introduction to a previous research work performed at the 
Tudor Centre with respect to the definition of a domain model 
associated with the concepts that can be found in security risks 
analysis methods. On the other hand we recall the modeling 
concepts available in the ArchiMate language and emphasize 
motivational elements included in the ArchiMate Motivation 
Extension. In Section III the core of the proposed extended 
EAM is presented through the study of the mapping that can be 
made between the security risk metamodel concepts and those 
of the ArchiMate metamodel. This mapping is done within the 
perspective of service oriented EA. By doing so, we explain 
how security risks concepts can be embedded in the ArchiMate 
language. We illustrate the result of this embedding in Section 
IV where we apply the proposed security extended EAM in the 
context of a case study and show how its application can be 
captured in terms of an ArchiMate model. Section V reviews 
existing approaches with similar research objectives and 
Section VI concludes with some future perspectives regarding 
the positioning of our work.  
II. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
In this section, we introduce our two main sources of 
knowledge on which our research built upon, namely a 
conceptual security risk model and the ArchiMate language.   
A. Risk Management 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is 
paramount because it helps companies to adopt cost-effective 
security measures. Indeed, security threats are so numerous that 
it is impossible to act on all of them because (1) every 
technological security solution has a cost, and (2) companies 
have limited resources. Hence, companies want to make sure 
that they adopt only solutions for which the Return On Security 
Investment (ROSI) is positive. This is done by comparing the 
cost of a solution with the risk of not using it, e.g. the cost of a 
business disruption due to a successful security attack.   
There exist a lot of ISSRM approaches. One of the main 
problems is that they all rely on different concepts and 
terminologies. Despite efforts started at the standardization 
level, there is still a need for a common unifying set of 
concepts. In a previous research performed at Tudor Centre, 
the different concepts of ISSRM and their relationships have 
been formalized under the form of a domain metamodel (Fig. 
1), i.e. a conceptual model depicting the studied domain [5], 
[6]. The ISSRM domain model has been established through 
the analysis of the related literature: risk management standards 
[7], [8] security-related standards [9], [10] security risk 
management standards [11]-[14] and methods [15]-[19] and 
security requirements engineering frameworks [20]-[22].  
The ISSRM domain model is organized in three groups of 
concepts, as represented on Fig. 1:  
 Asset-related concepts describe assets and the goals 
which guarantee asset security. 
 Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself is 
defined. 
 Risk treatment-related concepts describe what 
decisions, requirements and controls should be defined 
and implemented in order to mitigate possible risks. 
In this paper, we use the concept of Security Goal, which 
merges the concepts of Security Criterion and Security 
Objective defined in the initial model.  
 
Fig. 1. ISSRM domain model (extracted from [5]) 
The description of the main concepts of the ISSRM domain 
model is summarized in TABLE I.    
TABLE I.  ISSRM CONCEPTS (EXTRACTED FROM [5]) 
Concept Description 
Asset 
Anything that has value to the organization and is 
necessary for achieving its objectives 
Business Asset 
Describes information, processes, capabilities and 
skills inherent to the business and core mission of 
the organization, having value for it 
IS Asset 
A component of the IS supporting business assets 
like a database where information is stored 
Security Goal 
A property or constraint on business assets 
describing their security needs, usually for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability 
Risk 
The combination of a threat with one or more 
vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact 
harming the assets 
Impact 
The potential negative consequence of a risk that 
may harm assets of a system or an organization, 
when a threat (or the cause of a risk) is 
accomplished 
Vulnerability 
A characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets 
that can constitute a weakness or a flaw in terms of 
IS security 
Threat 
A potential attack or incident, which targets one or 
more IS assets and may lead to the assets being 
harmed 
Risk Treatment An intentional decision to treat identified risks 
Security 
Requirement 
The refinement of a treatment decision to mitigate 
the risk 
Control 
Controls (countermeasures or safeguards) are 
designed to improve security, specified by a 
Concept Description 
security requirement, and implemented to comply 
with it 
The ISSRM domain model is neutral with respect to the 
types of business, of industries and sectors. In section III, we 
will discuss of its specialization with respect to the service 
sector.  
B. EAML and ArchiMate 
The Open Group proposes ArchiMate as a standard 
Enterprise Architecture Modeling Language (EAML), which 
provides the capability to represent an enterprise in a uniform 
way, according to the multiple stakeholders’ viewpoints, across 
business, IS and IT architecture layers [2]. Although it has not 
been specifically developed for the service system domain, 
ArchiMate introduces constructs supporting the concept of 
service as an abstraction of the behavior exposed by a system 
[4]. In enterprise engineering, an enterprise is viewed as a 
complex designed system, and a service-oriented enterprise can 
therefore be considered as a set of services exposed to the 
enterprise’s environment.  
ArchiMate introduces a layered representation of the 
enterprise architecture, organized in 3 abstraction layers: 
business, application and technology. The layers conform to 
strict dependencies going from upper layer (business) to 
bottom layer (infrastructure), i.e. the elements of the business 
layer have dependencies on elements of the application layer, 
which have dependencies on elements of the technology layer. 
There are no dependencies permitted the other way round.  
The modeling pattern exposed in Figure 2 forms the 
foundation of the language: a service at the same time abstracts 
a behavior (that realizes the service) and is a part of a behavior 
(composed of services). The pattern is instantiated in each 
abstraction layer, contextualized with the relevant concepts of 
that layer introducing the concepts of business service, 
application service and infrastructure service. 
 
Fig. 2. ArchiMate modeling pattern (extracted from [4]) 
Two extensions have been introduced in the version 2.0 of 
the language specification: the Motivation extension and the 
Implementation and Migration extension. The Motivation 
extension (Fig. 3) defines the motivational element, abstracting 
“the reason lying behind the architecture of an enterprise”. A 
motivational element is related to a core element of the 
architecture through the concept of requirement: a requirement 
is realized by a (set of) core elements of the architecture. The 
motivation extension has been developed to support an 
additional dimension of the architecture: besides the what 
(passive structure), who (active structure) and how (behavior), 
the motivation supports the why dimension. The motivation is 
relevant in each of the 3 abstraction layers (business, 
application and technology) and allows tracing the rationale 
behind the elements of the architecture. 
 
Fig. 3. ArchiMate Motivation Extension (extracted from [4]) 
The definition of the main concepts of the ArchiMate 
metamodel is summarized in TABLE II.  
TABLE II.  ARCHIMATE CONCEPTS (EXTRACTED FROM [4]) 
Concept Description 
Business Service 
A service that fulfills a business need for a 
customer (internal or external to the organization). 
Business Object 
A passive element that has relevance from a 
business perspective. 
Business Process 
A behavior element that groups behavior based on 
an ordering  of activities. It is intended to produce 
a defined set of products or business services. 
Business Actor 
An organizational entity that is capable of 
performing behavior.  
Business Role 
The responsibility for performing specific 
behavior, to which an actor can be assigned. 
Application 
Service 
A service that exposes automated behavior. 
Application 
Component 
A modular, deployable, and replaceable part of a 
software system that encapsulates its behavior and 
data and exposes these through a set of interfaces. 
Data Object 
A passive element suitable for automated 
processing. 
Infrastructure 
Service 
An externally visible unit of functionality, 
provided by one or more nodes, exposed through 
well-defined interfaces, and meaningful to the 
environment. 
Node 
A computational resource upon which artifacts 
may be stored or deployed for execution. 
Device 
A hardware resource upon which artifacts may be 
stored or deployed for execution. 
Network 
A communication medium between two or more 
devices. 
System Software 
A software environment for specific types of 
components and objects that are deployed on it in 
the form of artifacts. 
Artifact 
A physical piece of data that is used or produced 
in a software development process, or by 
deployment and operation of a system. 
Value 
The relative worth, utility, or importance of a 
business service or product. 
Driver 
Something that creates, motivates, and fuels the 
change in an organization. 
Assessment The outcome of some analysis of some driver. 
Goal An end state that a stakeholder intends to achieve. 
Concept Description 
Requirement 
A statement of need that must be realized by a 
system. 
Principle 
A normative property of all systems in a given 
context, or the way in which they are realized. 
III. MAPPING OF CONCEPTS 
The purpose of our research is to build an extended EAM 
supporting a security risk-oriented design of an EA meeting its 
associated business services goals. This extended EAM is the 
result of the integration of ISSRM and EAM through the 
Enterprise Model Integration (EMI) approach [23], [24]. Given 
the two metamodels to integrate (ArchiMate and ISSRM), we 
concentrate on resolving the semantic heterogeneity through 
concept mapping and integration rules [25]: neither the 
syntactical nor the structural heterogeneity is indeed relevant in 
our case, as the ISSRM metamodel does not currently propose 
any concrete syntax. A concept mapping introduces a 
correspondence between at least one concept of each of the 
source model. The major correspondences are: Equivalence, 
Relation and Non-Relation. A relation between two concepts 
can be a generalization (and reversely specialization), a 
composition, an aggregation, an association, a classification. 
While the concept mapping addresses what is integrated, the 
integration rules addresses how the integration is actually 
performed, depending on the defined mapping. Equivalent 
concepts are integrated through an alignment rule (merge, 
mapping, abstraction), while related concepts are integrated 
through a connection rule (generalization, aggregation, 
composition, association, classification).  
In this paper, we specifically develop the mapping of 
concepts between both metamodels, also encompassing the 
service dimension. The result of the application of the 
integration rules is only briefly illustrated. 
A. Asset-Related Concepts 
The ISSRM distinguishes between business assets and IS 
assets (resources), as exposed in Section II. Security risk 
management practitioners usually classify business processes, 
information, skills and capabilities as business assets. We apply 
this classification and consider that in EAM, a Business 
Process, a Business Object, a Business Actor and a Business 
Role are all business assets. These elements deliver Value 
through the central concept of Business Service: information, 
business processes and skills are leveraged for the service-
oriented enterprise to deliver its value (through the business 
service). The Business Service encapsulates these business 
assets and abstracts the value they bring to the enterprise. 
We therefore introduce the first mapping of concepts: a 
Business Process, a Business Object, a Business Actor and a 
Business Role, all are specializations of a Business Asset in 
terms of risk management.  
The concept of IS Asset in ISSRM abstracts a component 
of the IS that support the business asset. It is very close to the 
EAM domain that considers that elements of the application 
layer realize (or are used by) the elements of the business layer.  
Application and infrastructure services are the major 
abstractions of the application and technology layers. They are 
however not sufficient to be considered in the mapping of the 
IS Asset in terms of risk management: the vulnerabilities are 
indeed not the characteristics of the packaged set of resources 
(which the service abstracts), but of the actual components that 
the service is made of, i.e. of the structural elements of the 
technology architecture.  
A second mapping of concepts is therefore introduced in 
the form of specialization between the structural elements of 
the technology and application layers and the IS Asset concept 
of ISSRM: a node, a device, a system software, a network and 
an application component, all are specialization of IS Asset. 
This means that the vulnerabilities of all these elements need to 
be identified in a risk assessment exercise.  
B. Risk-Related Concepts 
A Security Goal represents an intention of securing the 
business assets in order to increase the value of the associated 
business service. For example, the confidentiality of the 
information manipulated by the business service increases the 
value of the service when it is relevant for the business. 
Although it could be tempting associating the Security Goal 
with a goal in terms of EAM, it is important to remind that risk 
management defines the Security Goal as an indicator to assess 
the significance of the risks. We therefore choose to map the 
Security Goal to the concept of Driver in terms of EAM (a 
Security Goal is-a Driver), and the concept of Risk to the 
concept of Assessment (a Risk is-a Assessment). The mapping 
of the relation between Security Goal and Business Asset 
requires additional concepts to be considered: ArchiMate 
indeed does not support direct relation between Driver 
(Security Goal) and the elements of the business layer 
(Business Asset). However, a Driver influences the Value of a 
Business Service: the Security Goal associated with a Business 
Asset influences the value of the Business Service 
encapsulating these assets, e.g. the confidentiality of the 
information manipulated by the business service increases the 
value of the business service in today’s context of cloud 
infrastructure. Given this mapping of concepts, security risk 
management can therefore be expressed in the following way: 
the risk is the outcome of the analysis made on the intention to 
secure business elements of the enterprise in order to increase 
the value of the associated business service.  
The components of the Risk (Event and Impact) are also 
modeled with the concept of Assessment and the composition 
relation (an Assessment composed of other Assessments), as 
they are the results of the risk analysis. The same approach is 
applied to map the Threat and the Vulnerability.  
As explained in Section II, there are causal chains of 
impacts. Final elements of these chains (like, the loss of 
reputation) negatively impact the value of one or several 
business services, through a negative influence on a Driver. We 
propose modeling the chain of impacts in ArchiMate with a 
composition of impacts. It should be noted that the final 
element of a chain of impact might negatively influence 
another driver than the one that initiated the risk assessment, 
and even a non-security driver. For instance, the ‘Reputation of 
the Enterprise’ is a strategic driver that is not a security goal. It 
is however negatively influenced by the impact ‘loss of 
reputation’ associated with the security risk ‘identification 
theft’ associated with the security goal ‘Guarantee integrity of 
information’. It is therefore very relevant to integrate the 
analysis of security risks as a strategic activity of the enterprise, 
and not perform it in a silo.  
C. Risk Treatment-Related Concepts 
Risk treatment deals with the decisions and solutions 
developed to overcome the risks after they have been identified 
and assessed. The goal of that part of the model is very relevant 
to EAM as a governing tool.  
The Risk Treatment is the decision of how to treat the Risk: 
retention, reduction, transfer, avoidance. It is mapped to the 
EAM concept of Goal: the Goal (Risk Treatment) addresses the 
Assessment (Risk) of the Driver (Security Goal). The Security 
Requirement is introduced when the Risk Treatment decision is 
to reduce the risk. The Security Requirement is naturally 
modeled with the EAM concept of Requirement: they are the 
means to reach the end, i.e. to realize the Goal. Finally, the 
Control as the abstraction of the solution that implements the 
Security Requirement is mapped to a (set of) Core Elements of 
the architecture: the realization relation between Requirement 
and Core Element is used to trace the rationale behind the 
elements of the solution. The solution to a security requirement 
can be realized by elements of the business layer, application 
layer and/or infrastructure layer. When multiple solutions can 
be envisaged, the enterprise architecture models represent a 
support to take the final decision, potentially based on an ROI 
analysis.  
It should be noted that ArchiMate introduces also the 
concept of Principle, supporting an indirection between the 
Goal and the Requirements. It might be very useful in the 
design of the Security solution that addresses the security risks: 
the security guidelines that are very common in the security 
domain (although not part of the ISSRM model) can benefit 
from this modeling element. 
D. Integrated Metamodel 
The mapping between the concepts of ISSRM and EAM is 
summarized in TABLE III.  
TABLE III.  ISSRM-EAM CONCEPTS MAPPING 
ISSRM Concept EAM Concept Mapping 
Business Asset Business Process Generalisation 
Business Asset Business Object Generalisation 
Business Asset Business Actor Generalisation 
Business Asset Business Role Generalisation 
IS Asset 
Application 
Component 
Generalisation 
IS Asset System Software Generalisation 
IS Asset Node Generalisation 
IS Asset Device Generalisation 
IS Asset Network Generalisation 
Security 
Objective 
Driver Specialisation 
ISSRM Concept EAM Concept Mapping 
Risk Assessment Specialisation 
Event Assessment Specialisation 
Impact Assessment Specialisation 
Threat Assessment Specialisation 
Vulnerability Assessment Specialisation 
Risk Treatment Goal Specialisation 
Security 
Requirement 
Requirement Specialisation 
Control Core Element Specialisation 
Once the concepts are mapped, the rules (how) to integrate 
the concepts within the integrated metamodel are defined. The 
concepts are mainly mapped through generalisation (or 
specialisation) relation and we apply the related generalisation 
(or specialisation) integration rule. When it comes to adopt a 
representation of the risk concepts (concrete syntax) within the 
integrated model, we decide at this stage to reuse the existing 
ArchiMate notation: a Security Goal is a Driver, and reuses the 
Driver symbol as representation. A part of the resulting 
integrated metamodel is illustrated in Fig. 4, in the ArchiMate 
notation. 
 
Fig. 4. ISSRM in Relation with EAM 
IV. CASE STUDY – @RCHIMED 
The metamodel integration is illustrated with a lab case study, 
@rchimed
1
, which is a reference case study for the EBIOS 
method [15]. This latter is a risk analysis method defined by 
the French Ministry of Defense which firstly allows evaluating 
security risks of the IS and secondly allows elaborating 
appropriate policies according to the organization needs. The 
description of the case study is organized in two parts. In the 
first part, we present the context and the existing enterprise 
architecture of @rchimed. During this part, we identify the 
assets of the enterprise and we elaborate a standard 
ArchiMate-based EA model that highlights the connections 
between the business assets and the IS assets. The second part 
of the case study concerns the security risk management 
extension. We model the @rchimed enterprise risks following 
the mapping realized in Section III. 
                                                          
1  http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/EBIOS-EtudeDeCas-Archimed-
2010-01-25.pdf 
A. @rchimed architecture 
@rchimed is an AEC company specialized in the design of 
blueprints for the building of new factories and offices. To that 
end, @rchimed offers, to its customers, services related to the 
analysis of building stability and estimations of the costs. The 
reputation of the enterprise is a very important factor to win 
market shares in a more and more competitive market. 
@rchimed’s strategy is based on two drivers: on one hand 
improving the reputation of the company, and on the other 
hand reducing the costs to remain competitive.  
We focus on the studies elaboration business service, 
exploited by external customers, and achieved by three 
processes performed by the @rchimed experts, namely: the 
visualization elaboration, the structures calculation and the 
technical plans elaboration. These processes generate two 
business objects: the building structure calculations and the 
structural parameters. Amongst these processes, the structures 
calculation is supported by the calculation service which is 
itself realized by the Structure Management Software. This 
application is accessed by the experts through the parameters 
setting interface and generates the calculations on files, listings 
and USB supports. The value of the studies elaboration 
business service relies upon the accuracy of the delivered 
product (to know: the structural parameters business object). 
This part of @rchimed has been modeled with ArchiMate and 
presented on the left top part of Figure 5. Regarding the 
management of the risks, we consider, that the studies 
elaboration business service corresponds to the business asset 
and that the Structure Management software application and 
parameters setting interface correspond to the IS assets. 
B. Risk management 
This second part of the case study corresponds to the 
deployment of a classical risk analysis that we have addressed 
through 3 steps (according to ISO 27005 [12]): definition of 
the security goals, analysis of the risks and definition of the 
risks treatment. 
1) Definition of the security goals 
  In order to support and increase the value of its studies 
elaboration business service, @rchimed identifies that from a 
security perspective it is of paramount importance to guarantee 
the integrity of the calculation (more than its availability or 
confidentiality). In terms of ArchiMate model, the security goal 
integrity of calculation is therefore modeled as a driver 
positively influencing the value of the business service studies 
elaboration.  
2) Risk analysis 
The second step of the analysis consists in determining the 
security risks and assessing them from the perspective of the 
identified security goal. Regarding the integrity of the 
calculation goals, the risk is naturally to have calculation 
alteration. This latter could happen following an identity theft 
due to a lack of access control on the information system. This 
risk has an impact on the loss of integrity, and according to a 
chain of impacts on the loss of reputation, the stability of 
building not guaranteed, building collapse, lawsuits. 
In terms of ArchiMate model, the calculation alteration is a 
risk modeled with the assessment construct. This assessment is 
a combination of two other assessments which correspond 
respectively to the impact and the event. In our case the impact 
is the loss of integrity as well as the chain of impacts (modeled 
as aggregated assessments), and the event corresponds to the 
identity theft. In the same way, the event is an assessment 
supported by a combination of two other assessments 
corresponding to the threat and to the vulnerability. According 
to the case study, these latter are, namely, the identity theft and 
the lack of access control. This lack of access control is a 
vulnerability that may be exploited when the expert introduces 
the structural parameters in the parameters setting interface: 
the vulnerability is characteristic of this interface, while the 
threat targets the expert actor.  
The impact loss of integrity negates the initial security goal 
integrity of the calculation and therefore has a negative 
influence on the value of the associated service. Moreover, the 
deduced impacts also have negative impacts for the strategy of 
the company: the loss of reputation negatively influences the 
strategic driver reputation of @rchimed, while the lawsuit 
negatively influences the strategic driver reduce costs.  
This second step of the case study highlights that it is 
possible with the ArchiMate language to identify the risks 
associated to (security) goals and to describe them in terms of 
impact, event, threat and vulnerability. However, the 
ArchiMate language does not allow relating the assessment 
concept to the core concepts with anything else than the very 
weak association relation. Thereby, it does not allow strongly 
typing the relation between the vulnerability and threat 
concepts with the core EAM concepts. 
C. Risk treatment 
The threat composing the calculation alteration risk being 
identified as a potential identity theft, a risk treatment action 
has to be undertaken. Although @rchimed is looking for cost 
reduction, the impacts of this risk are too high for the company 
to live with it.  The risk treatment decision could typically be 
supported with a cost-impact analysis. @rchimed decides for a 
risks reduction action associated with the deployment of an 
access right management. This control should guarantee the 
integrity of the parameters settings interface. 
This risk treatment is mapped on the concept of goal from the 
EAML and influences the value of confidentiality/integrity of 
the parameter settings interface. This goal is realized by a 
security requirement which requests to have an access right 
control service. This security requirement is mapped on the 
requirement concept from EAML and is realized by an access 
control service. This one is depicted on the left bottom part of 
Fig. 5. The service is realized by three security processes, 
namely: the policy elaboration (that generates the Security 
policies business object), the exceptions management and the 
access rights audit. All these processes are assigned to the 
security department and use the access right management 
application service. This latter is realized by an access control 
application that read the access control security policy data 
object and that collaborates with the parameters setting 
interface in order to control the user’s access rights. 
  
Fig. 5. @rchimed Extended Enterprise Architecture Model 
V. RELATED WORKS 
There exist many practical security risks management 
methods (like BSI, EBIOS, CRAMM, and Octave). However, 
they lack in formality for their produced analyses which are 
mostly based on natural language descriptions sometimes 
complemented with tables and informal diagrams. As stated in 
[6], the introduction of a model-based approach for ISSRM is 
relevant. It is motivated first by an efficiency improvement of 
the ISSRM process, and second by the enhancement of the 
product resulting of the performed process. 
In Requirements Engineering (RE), concepts associated 
with the analysis and the reasoning on security goals and 
requirements are introduced in languages like Secure i* [26] 
addressing security trade-offs, KAOS’ extension to security 
[27], and Secure Tropos [28] extending the language by 
considering security constraints and attack methods. Abuse 
cases [29], misuse cases [30] are other RE languages which 
extend the UML Use Case with a focus on threats and 
vulnerabilities. In Software Engineering, other extensions to 
UML have also been proposed for dealing with security issues 
at the design stages (security requirements and controls), like 
UMLsec [31] and SecureUML [32] but with less focus on 
business assets and high-level security requirements. 
In the languages mentioned above, only a part of the 
ISSRM concepts introduced in Section II is taken into account. 
A larger coverage of the risk related concepts is provided in the 
UML profile CORAS [33], in another extension of the i* 
framework [34] and in [35] where a full alignment of Secure 
Tropos with the ISSRM is presented. Despite these progresses, 
we argue that theses languages still lack from a crosscutting 
viewpoint relating all three conceptual areas of risk 
management together- assets, risks and risk treatments. We 
advocate that Enterprise Architecture Management (EAM) [3] 
provides an answer to this by acknowledging that an enterprise 
is a system that requires modeling from multiple perspectives 
and at different levels of abstraction. The EAM discipline 
permits the realization of informed enterprise governance, i.e. 
enterprise governance based on relevant information. 
Governance is associated with decision taking and associated 
risk assessment. Some recent works include the analysis of 
risks in relation with the business/IT alignment dimension [36] 
and within the context of the global GRC (Governance, Risk, 
Compliance) dimension [37]. Our work deepens these results 
by considering specific information security risks management 
in the line of [38] but by considering a larger ISSRM 
metamodel as well as its mapping into ArchiMate 
Integrating security risks management and enterprise 
architecture is also investigated by the ArchiMate forum
2
. The 
primary objective of this workgroup is to issue a white paper 
for guidelines about the Risk and Security extensions of 
ArchiMate. This extension foresees using existing ArchiMate 
concepts AS-IS to model risk/security aspects, to elaborate 
risk/security-specific specializations (stereotypes/profiles) and 
to define new concepts. We take part to this work and expect to 
leverage the results of the proposed mapping as an input to this 
activity. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed an integration of security 
risk management and enterprise architecture management in 
the form of concepts mapping between the metamodels of both 
domains. The proposed mapping of concepts allows moving 
further into the integration of risk management and enterprise 
architecture, especially in terms of method. The benefits of this 
integration have been illustrated with a case study. The 
approach leverages enterprise architecture modeling to support 
the identification of business and IS assets. It also proposes to 
model the treatment of the risk, especially in relation with the 
value of the risk treatment and with the rationale behind the 
elements of the architecture. It however does not give real 
support in the identification of the threats and vulnerabilities 
associated with the elements of the architecture: EAML indeed 
lacks the possibility to express the relations between the risk 
and assessed element (no direct relationship between 
Motivational Element and Core Element, at the exception of 
Requirement). This confirms that the Motivation Extension has 
been developed to explain the rationale behind the architecture, 
but not to support analysis of an existing architecture.  
The proposed extended EAM also addresses the mechanism 
to support the service industry with a model of risk that was 
initially targeting the security of information systems. We are 
currently investigating the extension of the ISSRM model to 
apply security risk management to service systems. It is 
specifically interesting in order to tackle the chain of risks 
through the networked enterprises.  
The extended EAM presented in this paper has been 
applied in a collaborative R&D project, and more specifically 
in the definition of a risk management method for the 
telecommunication sector, in collaboration with the national 
regulator in Luxembourg. Preliminary results have been 
presented in [40].  
                                                          
2  http://www.opengroup.org/archimate/ 
Although requirements to manage risks might be initiated 
by regulators in all industries, some organizations now 
consider their risk management capabilities as an opportunity 
to drive competitive advantage. In its 2011 study on Global 
Risk Management [39], Accenture identifies that “risk 
management is now more closely integrated with strategic 
planning and is conducted proactively, with an eye on how 
[risk management] capabilities might help a company move 
into new markets faster or pursue other evolving growth 
strategies. At its best, risk management is a matter of balance 
— the balance between a company’s appetite for risks and its 
ability to manage them”. We assist to the transformation of risk 
management from an operational regulatory constraint, to a 
mean to drive strategic enterprise transformation. This new 
perspective on risk management enforces the need to integrate 
risk management and EAM.  
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